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Constraints and opportunities associated with the
progression of an economy and its various industries have
been evidently influenced by the political system and the
public interests of the nation.
Indeed, dynamic interaction between social and public
interests determines the industry’s evolving path, hence its
changing performance over time.
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Nevertheless, none of them has ever explored the public
decision making process for the legalization and progress
of casino gaming


It has been recognized as one of the faster growing global
industries since the last decade of the 20th century



Social and public choices, and their changes may exert higher
weights in influencing the practice of casino gaming than economic
interests



Given the social interests, it is not necessarily identical to the
public choices which ultimately determine the legal structure and
organization of casino industry

History of the political economy study


Before the middle of the 20th century, economists were exclusively
interested in exploring the role of government in protecting
individuals and their property rights



From 1950s, inspired by Arrow in his Social Choice and Individual
Value (1951), researchers began to explore the formal and
informal constraints of government’s decision-making process and
the government failure caused



Currently, New Political Economy assumed that the decision
making process of a government is run by self-seeking politicians,
whose interests are influenced by, but not necessarily identical to
various interest groups
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Casino gaming is subject to the public choice on its
legitimacy in the first place, which further shapes its layout


An attractive proposition of casino gaming is the attempt to grasp
the explicit and considerable volume of economic returns, as well
as to propel the development and redevelopment of various related
sectors in the local economy



However, an unique attribute of casino gaming is that in the
process of providing related gambling services to the general
public, various averse social impacts (including social costs) may
be associated
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The pubic choice of casino gaming in any one jurisdiction
may also be influenced by the related public decisions in
the neighboring regions/nations






For example, following the successful experiences as reported by
Las Vegas since its liberalization by the end of the 1960s, Atlantic
City legalized its casino gaming in 1976

It is evident that while public choice is in principle reflecting
the social preference, it is not a static state and could be
varied over time when either (or both) the internal or (and)
external settings changed.


Thereafter, more and more states in the US chose to legalize their
own casinos, partly on the purpose to cannibalize the citizens’
gambling expenditures spent in other out-of-state casinos
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Generally speaking, three major groups may participate in
the public choice process of casino gaming

Following the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR)
Government of China liberalized its casino industry in 2002, and
the Singapore Government formally approved its casino bill in
2005, it is evident that the related changes in the public interests
towards casino gaming are diffusing to other Asian nations.

2. A public choice model


It is assumed that in the political process which determines
the public choice of casino gaming, there are two major
groups in actions – the anti-gaming (A) and the beneficiary
group (B)




It is assumed that there are a people in group A, and b people in
group B .

If casino gaming is legalized, the income redistributed to
each group are defined as
G
0
RA = Z AG − Z A0 and RB = Z B − Z B
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Generally speaking, legalization/liberalization of casino
gaming increase the monetary income of the local
economy to both group A and group B


New business opportunities are generated



The government may lower the direct and indirect taxations
imposed to its citizens, as well as subsidize and provide more
public services

Non-monetary terms like the ethical and religious concerns
may also take effect in the legalization process
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It is firstly assumed that the expected benefit of group B to
participate in the legalization process can be separated into
two terms


The expected utility when group B win (U BG)


It is comprised of both monetary and nonmonetary terms

U BG = Z BG + EB


The voting taste (t B )


It is independent from the voting result
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The emotional benefit of group B could simply be
expressed as the happiness to gamble, the easy access to
good quality service, etc




Indeed, it could be stimulated by government signaling: If the
government provides more clear signals for casino legalization,
group B may be more incline to participate in the voting process
∂E B
>0
E B = F (s ) and
∂s



ĵ

PB (i, j − 1)


participate

U B0 = Z B0



Consequently, the person will only participate in the
process if

(1 − PB (i, j ))(U B0 +t B −c ˆj )

PB (i, j )(U BG +t B −c ĵ )

(1 − PB (i, j − 1))U B0

PB (i, j − 1)U BG

does not
participate
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The first order condition of group B’s maximization is given
by
V ' = b( RB + E B )(

∆PB ( RB + E B ) + t B > c ˆj



The expected benefit of an extra person in group B when
s/he participate or not
Possible results of casino legislation
Casino prohibition
Casino legalization

If casino is prohibited, however, there will be no income
redistribution and the income/emotional benefit of group B will
retain at the original level
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Suppose that there are already i persons in group A and j-1
persons in group B who will participate in the voting
process, the possibility that the casino will be legalized (i.e.,
group B win) is

∂PB
∂C
) + tB − B = 0
∂j
∂j

Hence the equilibrium state is

The group leaders (i.e., the related governors) of group B
need to choose j to maximize the group’s expected utility
max V = b[ PB (i, j )U BG + (1 − PB (i, j ))U B0 ] + jt B − CB

2. A public choice model
2.2 The anti-gaming group model


Different from group B, individuals in group A concern more
on the emotional/ethical benefits s/he can obtain from
casino prohibition, and ignore the monetary benefit when
casino is legalized
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Possible results of casino legislation
Casino prohibition Casino legalization

Their utility on the expected income redistribution of casino
legalization is zero
U ( RA ) = 0



They will obtain positive emotional benefit when casino is
prohibited as they are strictly preferred casino prohibition to
legalization.
U A0 = Z A0 + E A

and U AG = Z A0 + U ( R A ) = Z A0

The expected benefit of an extra person in group A is



participate

PA (i, j )(U A0 +t A −ciˆ ) (1 − PA (i, j ))(U AG +t A −ciˆ )

does not
participate

PA (i − 1, j )U A0

(1 − PA (i − 1, j ))U AG

Consequently, the extra person will only participate in the
process if
∆PA E A + t A > ciˆ
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The governors who want to prohibit casino gaming will
choose i to maximize the group’s expected utility
max



W = a[ PA (i, j )U A0 + (1 − PA (i, j ))U AG ] + it A − C A

The equilibrium state is



If i>j, the anti-gaming group has more power to lobby the
government and casino is more probably be prohibited



If i<j, more individuals in the beneficiary group decided to
participate in the process, casino may be legalized



Exemptions may exist when the beneficiary group can have
more discourse power in the government through lobbying
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Mode of legalization
Year
Local
legalized Legislativ Referen option
e action dum
vote
Nevada
1931
New Jersey
1976
Iowa
1989
South Dakota
1989
Colorado
1990
Illinois
1990
Mississippi
1990
Louisiana
1991
Indiana
1993
Missouri
1993
West Virginia
1994
Michigan
1996
Pennsylvania
2004
Kansas
2007
Maryland
2008
State

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√



It’s clear that the
legislative result of
casino gaming is
more commonly
relied on the
government (i.e.,
legislative action)
and the interest
groups (i.e., local
option vote)



However, the public choice is more probably departed from social
choice in casino legalization through legislative action


Nevada legalized casino gaming in 1931 with legislative
action to stimulate its economy
 But

the organized crime is flourished thereafter, and hence casino
faced numerous pressures both from the community and from the
federal government to be banned





It has continuous support from the state government and its legal
status can be sustained

The legislative action of casino legalization mainly demonstrates that
the “small group” is able to press the government and hence the
public choice

√
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If each voter involved in the casino legalization process can
spend identical expenditures on political pressure and is
weighted equally, the legislation result of casino gaming is
then decided by the comparison of i and j

∂PA
∂C A
) + tA −
=0
∂i
∂i
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The first order condition of group A’s maximization is
W ' = aE A (



2. A public choice model
2.2 The anti-gaming group model

In 1974, the governors who support to legalize casino in
Atlantic City placed a casino proposal, on the New Jersey
general election ballot


It would have permitted state-owned casino throughout the state



The general public may still held a negative image to casino
gaming

After their defeat in 1974, supporters of casino gaming
placed another referendum in 1976 that would permit
private-owned casino in Atlantic City only
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3.2 Taiwan’s case


In 2009, Taiwanese government passed a new casino
regulation, which stated that legalized casino can be built
on offshore islands with the passage of local referendum




3. Evidences and discussions
3.1 New Jersey’s case


It’s clear that the expected monetary benefit played a more
concentrated role in deciding the casino legalization result, such as
in the 1976 referendum, which may induce the departure of public
choice (e.g., casino legalization) from social choice (e.g., prevailed
negative image of casino gaming)



Nevertheless, if the expected benefit is not clearly stated, which
may partly due to the absent of government signaling, the voting
taste/emotional concern turns to be the key factor and hence the
public choice (e.g., casino prohibition in the 1974 referendum)
would be identical to the social choice
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3.2 Taiwan’s case
 Penghu

has a well-established infrastructure and
industry base with abundant natural resources

Following this new regulation, Penghu was the first to hold a
referendum on a tourist casino proposal in 2009, although it was
then defeated by the local voters.
In 2012, however, Matsu proposed another casino plan and was
able to be passed
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Nevertheless, because of the global financial tsunami, the local
government suffered from a financial deficit



Hence the government would like to legalize casino to foster the
economic growth by attracting tourisms and creating new jobs

Matsu has a less developed infrastructure


But its geographic advantage made it possible to attract Chinese
gamblers as a casino destination



Different from Penghu, the referendum in Matsu stated clearly the
community’s benefit from legalized casino
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The two referendums in Penghu and Matsu indicated that,
other than the expected benefit, the group size is also
important in the progress of casino legalization


If the expected benefit can be spread more widely in the
community, such as the case in Matsu, the beneficiary group’s size
can be increased, which may provide a solid base for the potential
supporters



If, on the contrary, the expected benefit of casino gaming is
concentrated on a certain group, as the case in Penghu, the
majority may just comply the conventions to play against casino

4. Conclusions and remarks


The motivation to participate in casino legalization process
is varied across different groups




4. Conclusions and remarks


With reference to public choice theory, especially the
group’s voting behavior, this paper is able to formulate a
theoretical framework on the progression of casino gaming,
which is further examined by the experience in New Jersey
and Taiwan.



The progression of casino gaming represents a
compromise of both monetary and non-monetary interests
and their changes over time, instead of a sole economic
consequence

4. Conclusions and remarks


The beneficiary group, which includes the governors, the casino
operators, the related tourism industries, etc, are mainly concerned
with the direct economic benefit from casino gaming
While the anti-gaming group, which is comprised of church groups,
religious groups, local service industries, etc, are motivated, to a
large scale, by the emotional and ethical concerns


Thank you !

The experiences in New Jersey and Taiwan not only
verified the aforementioned model, but also provided
valuable policy suggestions


It implied that it’s an efficient strategy for the government,
especially for those countries that have a large religious people
and conservatives, to state clearly the expected benefit of the
mass community with casino legalization



It’s evident that the more people aware what they will benefit from
casino gaming, the more support the government will have

It’s crucial for the further researches to develop specific
models, which is suitable to a given region, with reference
to its specific characters

